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As a result of worldwide decentralization, subnational 
debt is rising. Subnational debt crises in major developing 
countries in the 1990s have led to strengthened 
regulatory frameworks for subnational borrowing and 
insolvency. With the fragility of the global recovery 
and increasing public debt, and the structural trends 
of decentralization and urbanization, it becomes more 
important to prudently manage subnational default 
risks. Although the regulatory frameworks share central 
features, the historical context and entry points for 
This paper—a product of the Economic Policy and Debt Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network—is part of a larger effort in the department to develop knowledge products on subnational finance and fiscal 
reforms. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at lliu@worldbank.org.  
reform drive variations across countries. Addressing 
soft budget constraints is integral to the regulatory 
framework. Ex ante fiscal rules for subnational 
governments attempt to limit default risks; ex post 
regulation predictably allocates default risk, while 
providing breathing space for orderly debt restructuring 
and fiscal adjustment, as well as the continued delivery 
of essential public services. The regulatory reforms are 
inseparable from the reform of broader intergovernmental 
fiscal systems and financial markets.  
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1. Introduction 
State and local government debt and guarantees for quasi-public agency debt have been growing 
in importance in developing countries.  In Brazil, subnational debt accounts for about 30 percent 
of total public sector net debt.
2  The debt of Indian states is about 27 percent of GDP.
3  
Subnational debt financing has been historically important in the United States, with outstanding 
subnational debt at US$2.36 trillion at the end of 2009.
4  The increasing share of subnational 
debt of the consolidated public debt is not limited to federal countries.  In China, urban 
investment companies have been borrowing from financial institutions to finance large-scale 
infrastructure investments.
5  In France, a unitary country, subnational governments (SNGs) 
account for over 70 percent of public investment. 
The increasing importance of subnational debt is due to, inter alia, increasing decentralization of 
spending responsibilities, taxation power, and borrowing capacity to SNGs.  The unprecedented 
scale of urbanization in developing countries requires large-scale infrastructure investment 
financing to absorb massive influxes of rural population.  Subnational borrowing finances 
infrastructure more equitably across multi-generational users of infrastructure services, as 
maturity of debt service paid for by the beneficiaries can match the economic life of the assets 
that the debt is financing. In practice however, SNGs in some countries also borrow for current 
expenditures.  
With subnational borrowing come the risks of subnational insolvency.
6  Systemic subnational 
insolvency may impede the growth of subnational capital markets, curtail fiscal space for 
infrastructure investments, and threaten the financial stability and core public services. 
Additionally such situations may create pressures on the central government to provide financial 
assistance to assure the continuing provision of essential public services. More autonomy for 
SNG increases the need for strong regulation for fiscal responsibility. During the 1990s there 
were widespread subnational debt crises in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Russia, which have led to reforms to strengthen regulatory frameworks for subnational 
borrowing and insolvency. 
The global financial crisis has had a profound impact on subnational finance across countries 
(Canuto and Liu, 2010a).  Subnational finances deteriorated across a broad range of advanced, 
middle income and low income countries, although the degree of impact has varied. Rating 
agencies viewed the impact of economic downturn on the credit qualities of SNG as significant 
due to declines in the tax base, expenditure pressures or rigidities, and increasing and more 
                                                 
2 The term subnational in this paper refers to all tiers of government and public entities below the federal or central 
government. Subnational entities include states, counties, cities, towns, public utility companies, and other special-
purpose public entities that have the capacity to incur debt.  In Brazil, net debt is the difference between the gross 
debt and assets.  Data as of December 2009 (www.bcb.gov.br/?FISCPOLICY).   
3 As of December 2009 (www.rbi.org.in). The debt number would be higher if debt on the balance sheets of 
companies such as power and water, which are wholly or largely owned by the states, is included.  
4 www.federalreserve.gov. 
5 Liu (2008). 
6 In a legal sense, subnational insolvency refers to the inability to pay debts as they fall due; however, details of the 
definition of “insolvency” vary across countries. In addition to default (failure to pay according to the terms of the 
debt instrument), insolvency is characterized by a genuine, and not merely temporary, shortfall of resources to 
service debt. See Liu and Waibel (2009). 3 
 
expensive debt.
7  With the fragility of the global recovery and increasing public debt, it becomes 
even more important to prudently manage subnational default risks. Beyond the current crisis, 
the structural trends of decentralization and urbanization are expected to continue with force, 
requiring prudent management of subnational default risks.  
This paper draws lessons that may be gleaned from previous episodes of subnational financial 
distress and their interaction with sovereign defaults.  We pay particular attention to the legal and 
institutional principles underpinning the debt restructuring and fiscal adjustment process in 
subnational insolvency proceedings. Looking across countries, regulatory frameworks for 
subnational insolvency share central features, though important variations are explained by the 
historical context and entry points for reform.  An important objective of the regulatory 
framework is to address soft budget constraint and the problem of overgrazing of the common 
resources by SNGs.  While fiscal rules for SNG or ex ante regulation attempt to limit the risk of 
subnational defaults, ex post regulation predictably allocates default risk, while providing 
breathing space for orderly debt restructuring and fiscal adjustment, as well as the continued 
delivery of essential public services. However, ex ante and ex post regulatory systems alone 
cannot assure the sustainability of SNG debt.  Intergovernmental fiscal systems and financial 
market development, though outside the scope of this paper, are equally important.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the motivation and rationale for 
regulating subnational debt financing. This motivation is country-specific and shapes the design.  
Section 3 summarizes regulatory frameworks for subnational borrowing based on cross-country 
experiences focusing on fiscal rules for SNG with respect to debt issuing procedures, specifying 
purpose, types, amount, and procedures of debt financing. Section 4 explores the key issues in 
designing insolvency mechanisms, encapsulated in the trade-off between protecting creditor’s 
contractual rights and maintaining minimum public services. Section 5 presents concluding 
remarks and draws policy lessons.  
2.  Rationale for Regulating Subnational Debt Financing  
The development of regulatory frameworks for subnational debt financing in developing 
countries such as Brazil, India, Mexico and Russia has been in response to the subnational fiscal 
stress and debt crises there of the 1990s. Some newly decentralizing countries such as Peru 
developed SNG debt financing frameworks while initiating decentralization based on lessons 
learned from other countries on the fiscal risks associated with decentralization.  Developed 
countries such as France and the United States have had their own experiences of subnational 
insolvency which led to the establishment of systems to regulate the risks.  
Subnational debt crises 
Although expenditure-revenue imbalances may cause the development of subnational fiscal 
stress, the regulatory framework for debt financing profoundly affects the fiscal sustainability of 
SNG, because accumulation of the fiscal deficits is feasible only when they have been financed. 
Such financing can take multiple forms, including direct borrowing as well as running arrears.  
                                                 
7 Fitch 2009, Moody’s 2010, S&P 2010.   4 
 
Unregulated subnational borrowing grew rapidly in countries such as Hungary and Russia in the 
1990s, contributing to subnational fiscal stress. Borrowing by SNGs in Hungary and Russia was 
also facilitated by decentralization, which granted substantial autonomy in debt financing to 
SNGs but failed to impose hard budget constraints.  
Unregulated borrowing is particularly risky in an uncertain macroeconomic environment, as 
illustrated by the subnational debt crises in Russia where at least 57 of 89 regional governments 
defaulted on debt payments from 1998 to 2001. Unfettered market access by subnational 
borrowers, especially in newly minted, speculative, and unregulated security markets, can 
outpace the development of sound revenue streams and a regulatory framework. In particular, 
foreign borrowing in an uncertain macroeconomic environment with the risk of currency 
speculation can be costly (see Alam, Titov, and Petersen 2004). Because of the effect of 
macroeconomic policies, including interest rates and exchange rates on subnational fiscal 
profiles, the rating of the sovereign typically binds the ratings of its subnational entities.
8  
The fiscal deficit itself may not be a problem if borrowing finances capital investment and 
economic growth.
9  However, SNGs borrowed heavily to finance substantial operating deficits in 
countries such as Hungary, India, and Russia in the 1990s, leading to unsustainable debt paths.  
In India, much of the growth in fiscal deficits of states in the late 1990s was driven by borrowing 
to finance revenue deficits; for example, at the height of crisis, in some states more than 70 
percent of new borrowing was merely to refinance existing debt.
10  
Furthermore, certain debt profiles of SNGs can have inherent rollover risks, which are 
exacerbated by macroeconomic and financial shocks. Before the macroeconomic crisis in 
Mexico in the mid 1990s and in Russia in the late 1990s, SNGs in these countries had risky debt 
profiles, i.e., short maturities, high debt service ratios, and variable interest rates. The 
macroeconomic crisis exposed the vulnerability of SNGs to these fiscal positions and triggered 
widespread subnational debt crises.
11  
Finally, implicit or contingent liabilities have been a major source of fiscal deterioration in 
various developing countries. In the late 1990s, guarantees by Indian states to support market 
borrowing of loss-making public sector undertakings, a contingent liability, grew rapidly. Early 
episodes of subnational debt development in the 1840s in the United States show how contingent 
liabilities contributed to the states’ debt crisis (Wallis, 2004).  Important sources of implicit or 
                                                 
8  For how sovereign ratings affect subsovereign ratings, see Gaillard (2009). For how international rating agencies 
rate subnational creditworthiness, see Liu and Tan (2009). 
9 This statement assumes, however, that economic growth translates into increased capacity to service debt, which 
may not happen if a subnational government is unable to exploit its growing tax base. Then, borrowing can still 
provoke a fiscal crisis, even when the proceeds have been put to good use. This also assumes the general 
government debt is compatible with market financing capacity without crowding out private demands.  
10 Ianchovichina, Liu, and Nagarajan (2007) analyze key factors influencing subnational fiscal sustainability. 
Revenue deficit is the amount of current expenditure (such as wages, pension outlays, subsidies, transfers, and 
operation and maintenance) net of total revenues.  
11. From 1998 to 2001, at least 57 regional governments out of 89 defaulted in Russia (Alam, Titov, and Peterson, 
2004). In 2001, six years after the peso crisis, 60 percent of SNGs in Mexico still struggled financially (Schwarcz 
2002). One interesting difference is that SNGs were allowed to borrow overseas in Russia, whereas such borrowing 
was prohibited in Mexico. However, SNGs in Mexico were not insulated from foreign exchange risks, because the 
risks were transmitted through inflation and interest rates.  5 
 
contingent liabilities include: off-budget entities wholly or largely owned by SNGs, subnational 
civil-servant pension liabilities under the pay-as-you-go system, nonperforming assets of 
financial institutions owned by SNGs, and debt financing through arrears under the cash-
accounting system.
12  
Soft budget constraint 
Subnational debt financing behavior is strongly influenced by the design of the 
intergovernmental fiscal system and the structure of financial markets.  Market participants may 
tolerate unsustainable fiscal policy of a subnational government if the history backs their 
perception that the central government implicitly guarantees the debt service of the subnational 
government (Ianchovichina, Liu, and Nagarajan 2007).  A gap-filling grant transfer system for 
example induces SNGs to run fiscal deficit by reduced revenue efforts and increased incentives 
to spend.  Lack of own-source revenues for SNGs in many countries undermines the ability of 
SNGs for fiscal correction, a core element of any debt restructuring proceedings.  Furthermore, a 
competitive capital market prices risks and returns of subnational lending, helping screen and 
discipline subnational borrowing from the capital market side. This market discipline could be 
undermined by the dominance of lending to SNG by public banks. Abolishing central 
government explicit guarantees for SNG debt is not sufficient for nurturing the development of 
capital markets, as a range of factors including implicit guarantees affect demand and supply in 
the municipal finance market.  
Soft budget constraints, a key aspect of fiscal incentives, allow SNGs to live beyond their means, 
negating competitive incentives and fostering corruption and rent-seeking.
13 Unconditional 
bailouts of financially-troubled subnational entities by the national government create moral 
hazard and the implication of a sovereign guaranty and encourage fiscal irresponsibility and 
imprudent lending. In the United States, the no-bailout principle was established during the first 
subnational defaults in the 1840s (English 1996, Wallis 2004). In Hungary, one motivation for 
establishing a regulatory framework for subnational bankruptcy was to reduce moral hazard, 
impose a hard budget constraint for municipalities, shrink contingent liabilities of the central 
government, and change the perception among lenders that there was an implied sovereign 
guaranty.  After repeatedly bailing out SNG, Brazil followed a stricter approach, demanding 
subnational fiscal adjustment in return for fiscal relief (Box 1).   
Testing the predications implied by the common-pool game in federations where SNGs are more 
likely to have higher deficits because they do not internalize the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
profligacy, Khemani (2002) found that in 15 major states of India over the period 1972-1995, 
states have substantially higher spending and deficits (higher by about 10 percent of the sample 
average) when their government belongs to the same party as that governing at the center; and 
that intergovernmental grants tend to have a counter-intuitive negative effect on spending and 
deficits. This underscores the overall importance of political institutions in determining the 
consolidated government deficit, relative to specific rules of intergovernmental transfers. A 
substantial reform undertaken by Indian states in early to mid 2000s was the enactment of fiscal 
responsibility legislation (Thirteenth Finance Commission, 2009).  
                                                 
12 For a summary of hidden and contingent liabilities in several developing countries, see Liu and Waibel (2006). 
13  See Weingast (2007) for a summary of the literature within the context of second-generation fiscal federalism. 6 
 
 
Box 1:  Brazil States Debt Crisis and Reforms 
Brazil has substantially strengthened ex ante regulations in response to repeated waves of 
subnational debt crises. Statutory controls on subnational borrowing have always existed in 
Brazil—controls on new borrowing and on the total stock of debt, expressed as percentages of 
revenue. But they had loopholes, and SNGs had been creative in evading them. The regulations 
were strengthened in the late 1990s, leading to the unifying framework in 2000.   The federal 
government bailed out subnational debtors in earlier crises, but the resolution of the third debt 
crisis in 1997 was conditioned on states undertaking difficult fiscal and structural reforms. The 
avoidance of unconditional bailouts in 1997 was to resolve moral hazard. The strengthened ex 
ante borrowing regulations were embedded in the debt restructuring agreements between 25 
states and the federal government in 1997, sanctioned by legislation. The Fiscal Responsibility 
Law in 2000 consolidated various pieces of legislation into one unifying framework. 
Source: Dillinger (2002). Webb (2004). 
Legal and regulatory frameworks for SNG debt financing serve as a commitment device to allow 
SNGs to access the financial market within a common framework. An individual subnational 
government may adopt unsustainable fiscal policies for a variety of reasons. Inherent incentives 
exist for a subnational government to free-ride—it bears only part of the cost of unsustainable 
fiscal policies, but it alone receives all benefits. Realizing these benefits depends on good fiscal 
behavior by most of the other SNGs. So collectively governments benefit from a system of rules 
to discourage such defection and free-riding. This commitment device controls and coordinates 
SNGs across space in various localities and across time to commit future governments to a 
common borrowing framework (Webb 2004).   
Developing regulatory frameworks 
The motivations for developing regulatory frameworks differ significantly across countries, 
reflecting a country’s political, economic, and legal and historical context, which in combination 
with triggering events results in country-specific motivations. These differences affect the entry 
point for reform, the framework’s design, and its relation to subnational borrowing legislation. In 
particular, the frameworks for SNG debt financing and restructuring define the respective roles 
of different branches and tiers of the government, and a country’s political and economic history 
plays a key role in shaping the design.  
For example, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States (1937) was conceived with 
the narrow objective of resolving the holdout problem,
14 against the background of a mature 
intergovernmental fiscal system and a market-oriented financial system. Although the U.S. 
system offers a valuable reference, it cannot be copied without care.  The Municipal Finance 
Management Act of South Africa (2003) was intended to address a number of challenges 
including the development of a diversified and competitive subnational credit market. The 
                                                 
14 Holdout problem occurs when individual creditors who have different interests and security provisions for the 
debt owed to them and may often demand preferential treatment and threaten to derail debt restructurings voluntarily 
negotiated between a majority of creditors and the subnational debtor.  See McConnell and Picker (1993) 7 
 
Hungarian Law on Municipal Debt Adjustment (1996) was to impose a hard budget constraint on 
SNGs, to establish a transparent rule-based debt restructuring procedure without ad hoc political 
interventions, and to rebut the presumption of any implied sovereign guaranty.  
SNG default risk can be managed through two channels: first, fiscal rules for SNGs with respect 
to debt financing, i.e., ex ante regulation of borrowing and monitoring of the subnational fiscal 
position; second, ex post debt restructuring in the event that SNGs become insolvent.  Regulatory 
frameworks in many countries are still evolving, and the pace of putting together a full range of 
regulatory elements varies.   
Ex ante fiscal rules and ex post insolvency mechanisms complement each other. Insolvency 
mechanisms increase the pain of circumventing ex ante fiscal rules for lenders and SNG 
borrowers, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of preventive rules. Without insolvency 
mechanisms, ex ante regulations could turn to excessive administrative control and game playing 
between the central government and SNGs.
15 Overreliance on ex ante regulations could limit the 
role of markets in monitoring subnational borrowing and debt. In Canada and the United States, 
markets play a vital role in the surveillance of subnational borrowing. Although, it takes time to 
develop market systems, developing countries can gradually foster the role of the market in the 
design of regulatory frameworks.
16 
3.   Fiscal Rules for Subnational Debt Financing: Ex ante Regulation 
Fiscal rules for SNG debt financing deal with debt issuing procedures, specifying purpose, types, 
amount, procedures and monitoring of debt financing.  Regulatory frameworks for subnational 
debt financing have been strengthened in various developing countries.  Box 1 presents country 
examples. Box 2 also includes examples from developed countries with the United States having 
the longest history of regulatory frameworks.  
Box 2: Fiscal Rules for SNG Debt Financing – Country Examples 
•  Brazil: Fiscal Responsibility Law 2000 
•  Colombia: Law 358 (1997); Law 617 (2000); Fiscal Transparency and Responsibility Law (2003) 
•  France: various borrowing regulations and balanced budget rules 
•  India: States Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Acts, following 12
th Finance 
Commission 
•  Mexico: Subnational borrowing framework 2000 
•  Peru: Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency Law (2003), General Debt Law (2005) 
•  Poland: Public Finance Law, 2005 
•  South Africa: Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 
•  Turkey: Various regulations since 2000 
•  US: states regulations (e.g., limit deficit financing) 
Source: Liu and Waibel (2008) and ongoing research by the authors. 
                                                 
15 The focus in this chapter is on demand-side regulation. On the supply side, various elements of the financial 
system, including competition and prudential regulations, come into play. 
16 When South Africa restructured its legal framework for municipal finance and management system in the 
postapartheid period, a clear objective was to nurture a competitive private municipal credit market in which private 
investors play a dominant role (South Africa National Treasury 2001: 192).  8 
 
Liu and Waibel (2008) point out several key common elements in ex ante borrowing regulation 
across several countries. First, borrowing is allowed only for long-term public capital 
investments. Some European countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, have enacted 
fiscal rules of a balanced budget net of public investment (the “golden rule”).
17 This element 
links back to the earlier idea that only such borrowing is beneficial (and may be in the interest of 
future generations). A number of middle-income countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, India, 
Peru, Russia, and South Africa, have recently adopted the golden rule.
18  
Second, the frameworks specify limits on key fiscal variables, such as fiscal deficit, primary 
deficit, debt service ratios, and ceilings on guarantees issued. In India, fiscal responsibility 
legislation is mandatory for all states by the 12th Finance Commission, with the revenue deficit 
to be eliminated and the fiscal deficit to be reduced to 3 percent of gross state domestic product 
(GSDP) by fiscal year 2009.
19  Colombia established a traffic-light system to regulate 
subnational borrowing.
20 SNGs rated in the red-light zone are prohibited from borrowing, and 
those in the green-light zone are permitted to borrow. The red-light zone is reached when the  
interest to operational savings ratio is greater than 40 percent and the debt stock to current 
revenues ratio is greater than 80 percent. In Brazil, the debt restructuring agreements between the 
federal government and the states established a comprehensive list of fiscal targets including 
debt-to-revenue ratio, primary balance, personnel spending, and a list of state-owned enterprises 
or banks to be privatized or concessioned. In the United States, each state sets fiscal limits for 
itself and for its local governments.   
Third, several legal frameworks, such as those in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, include procedural 
requirements that SNGs establish a medium-term fiscal framework and a transparent budgetary 
process. This requirement is intended to ensure that fiscal accounts move within a sustainable 
debt path and that fiscal adjustment takes a medium-term approach to better respond to shocks 
and differing trajectories for key macroeconomic variables that affect subnational finance. The 
transparent budgetary process affords debates by executive and legislative branches on spending 
priorities, funding sources, and required fiscal adjustments.  
Furthermore, fiscal transparency is increasingly becoming an integrated part of fiscal 
frameworks. Transparency includes having an independent audit of subnational financial 
accounts, making periodic public disclosures of key fiscal data, exposing hidden liabilities, and 
moving off-budget liabilities on budget.  In Brazil, for example, article 48 of Brazil’s Fiscal 
Responsibility Law (2000) enshrines fiscal transparency as a key component of the new 
framework. Proposals, laws, and accounts are to be widely distributed, including through the use 
of electronic media (all reports are made available on the Web site of the Ministry of the 
Treasury). Article 54 requires that all levels of governments publish a quarterly fiscal 
management report that contains the major fiscal variables and indicates compliance with fiscal 
targets. Pursuant to article 57, this report is to be certified by the audit courts. 
                                                 
17 Short-term borrowing for working capital is still allowed, but provisions should be built in to prevent governments 
from rollover borrowing as a way of long-term borrowing for operating deficits.  
18 See Liu and Waibel (2008) for details.  
19 Revenue deficit is the difference between total revenues and current expenditures. The fiscal targets were relaxed 
in response to the 2008-09 global financial crisis (www.rbi.org.in). 
20 Law 358 in 1997 and the Fiscal Transparency and Responsibility Law in 2003. 9 
 
Fiscal rules for SNG debt financing can be supported by regulations on lenders. To improve 
fiscal transparency, Mexico introduced a credit rating system for SNGs. Although subnational 
participation in the credit rating is voluntary, the requirements of the capital-risk weighting of 
bank loans introduced in 2000 and of loss provisions introduced in 2004 aim at imposing 
subnational fiscal discipline through the market pricing of subnational credit. In Colombia, the 
Fiscal Transparency and Responsibility Law (2003) also tightened the regulations on the supply 
side. Lending to subnationals by financial institutions and territorial development institutions 
must meet the conditions and limits of various regulations, such as Law 617 and Law 817. 
Otherwise, the credit contract is invalid and borrowed funds must be restituted promptly without 
interest or any other charges. 
Control and monitoring mechanisms, as part of ex ante fiscal rules, can substantially reduce the 
risk of insolvency. The following contrasts two examples: France, a unitary country, and the 
State of Ohio in the United States, a federal country where local governments are political 
divisions of the states.  
France: Notwithstanding considerable fiscal autonomy of SNGs, the state exercises strong 
supervision and monitoring of SNG financial accounts through three institutions: the Prefect, the 
Regional Chamber of Accounts “chambres regionales des comptes” (CRC), and Public 
Accountants.  In the case of budget deficit, late approval or non-budgeted mandatory expenses 
(such as debt service), the prefect (and every interested person) can refer the case to CRC. If the 
SNG does not follow the statement made by the CRC, the Prefect can adopt the budget.  The 
CRC also exercises financial supervision.   
The key element of internal control is to separate the decision making, embodied in the president 
of the local government council, who contracts expenditure, from the actual payments made by 
the public accountant, who is part of the central government.  This means that there are two sets 
of departmental accounts that must tally.  Public accountants themselves are subject to audit and 
control by the central government.   
Ohio State: The Fiscal Watch Program in Ohio implemented by the Office of Auditor of State 
acts as an early warning system to prevent local governments, including counties, municipalities, 
school districts, state universities and colleges, from slipping into fiscal distress.
21 A local 
government that is approaching a state of fiscal emergency as defined by specific financial 
indicators will be placed under the fiscal watch program.   
The local government under the program takes fiscal corrective actions. The fiscal watch 
continues to be in effect until the auditor determines that the conditions are no longer present and 
cancels the watch, or until the auditor determines that the local government be placed under the 
fiscal emergency program under the pre-defined fiscal indicators.  A commission will be formed 
for a local government under the fiscal emergency program, to assist in preparing and 
implementing a long-tem financial recovery plan accepted by both the local government and the 
commission.  The Auditor of State’s Office serves as financial supervisor to the commission and 
provides technical support and advice. The Auditor of State’s Office also examines the existing 
                                                 
 
21 http://www.auditor.state.oh.us. 10 
 
system of governmental accounting and reporting as well as identifies the improvements needed 
to be made in a report. 
The commission stops its activity under two conditions: (1) the local government has been 
terminated from fiscal emergency conditions that prompted the initial declaration and made the 
necessary improvements in its accounting and reporting system; or (2) the local government has 
a plan in place, which is intended to eliminate fiscal emergency condition and satisfy the 
improvements within two years. If the fiscal emergency is terminated prior to these conditions 
being met, the Auditor of State is required to monitor the progress of the government to insure 
full implementation of an effective accounting system and the complete elimination of the 
emergency conditions.  
4.  Regulatory Frameworks for Subnational Debt Financing: Insolvency Mechanisms  
Ex post regulation—that is, subnational insolvency mechanisms—deals with insolvent SNGs.
22  
Notwithstanding fiscal rules for ex ante control, defaults can happen owing to a subnational’s 
own fiscal mismanagement or macroeconomic and exogenous shocks. A well-designed 
insolvency mechanism serves multiple objectives: to enforce hard budget constraints on SNGs; 
to maintain essential services while restructuring debt; and to restore the financial health of the 
subnational government so that it may reenter the financial market.  
The need for a collective framework for resolving debt claims is driven by conflicts between 
creditors and debtor, and among creditors. Individual creditors may have different interests and 
security provisions for the debt owed to them and may often demand preferential treatment and 
threaten to derail debt restructurings voluntarily negotiated between a majority of creditors and 
the subnational debtor—the so-called holdout problem (McConnell and Picker, 1993). Individual 
ad hoc negotiations are costly, impracticable, and harmful to the interests of a majority of 
creditors. The holdout problem is not as serious if debts are concentrated in a few banks. 
However, a collective framework for insolvency restructuring takes on more importance as the 
subnational bond markets develop—with thousands of creditors.  
Clear creditor remedies allow collective enforcement and facilitate efficient debt adjustment.  
Creditors’ remedies in contract laws, instead of bankruptcy mechanisms, are effective to enforce 
discrete unpaid obligations. However, individual lawsuits or negotiations become ineffective if 
there is a general inability to pay. This holdout problem causes uncertainty and prolongs the debt 
restructuring process. Resolving the holdout problem was the primary motivation for the United 
States to enact Chapter 9 (McConnell and Picker, 1993). 
Key design considerations arise concerning insolvency procedures—namely, the fundamental 
differences between public and private insolvency, the choices between judicial or administrative 
approaches, and the operation of the insolvency procedure itself.  
                                                 
22 It is useful to note that the boundary between ex ante regulation and ex post insolvency is not as clear cut. Fiscal 
responsibility regulation, for example, may incorporate elements of ex post consequences. Although Webb (2004) 
included transfer intercepts and lender control mechanism as part of ex post consequences, this section focuses on 
the insolvency proceedings. 11 
 
Comparing public and private corporate bankruptcy 
The public nature of the services provided by governments is the source of the fundamental 
difference between public insolvency and the bankruptcy of a private corporation. As a matter of 
public policy, public services essential for the public health, welfare and safety must be 
maintained. This factor leads to the basic tension between protecting creditors’ rights and 
maintaining essential public services. Creditors’ available remedies against defaulting 
subnationals, as opposed to corporations, are narrower, leading to greater moral hazard (strategic 
defaults). Whereas a corporation can be liquidated, this route is not available for SNGs. When a 
private corporation goes bankrupt, all assets of the corporation are potentially subject to 
attachment. By contrast, the ability of creditors to attach assets of SNGs is greatly restrained in 
many countries. In the case of subnational insolvency, the insolvency mechanism generally 
involves reorganization, rather than the liquidation of assets. Additionally, SNGs typically have 
some taxation power. 
The debt discharge protects the subnational entity and its population from long-term harm caused 
by sharp decreases in public service delivery. Thus, the insolvency system needs to balance 
incentives for the subnational entity to grow out of bankruptcy with repayment of creditors. A 
crucial question in the design of such legislation is to determine the balance between the 
legitimate contractual interests of private creditors and the delivery of essential public services, 
as well as to provide the SNG with the flexibility of growing out of its financial constraints. 
The public nature of the debtor may justify limitations on creditors’ valid private law contractual 
remedies compared to remedies that may be available against a private debtor.  Creditors will 
insist that all valid debts be honored and repaid. Ex ante, the subnational entity may pledge assets 
for financial resources; ex post, it will argue that many assets cannot be used for the satisfaction 
of creditors as they serve a public purpose.  The tension between creditor rights and subnational 
debtor’s inability to pay is here to stay. This tension is at its extreme when a debt discharge is 
needed thereby resulting in a major curtailment of creditor rights. 
In principle the answer of an insolvency framework to these competing interests is an equitable 
sharing of misery, a limitation on the SNG’s ability to provide nonessential services and a 
limitation on creditors’ remedies including the discharge of debt. A subnational bankruptcy 
framework also provides guidance on the priority of settling competing creditor claims.  Clear 
rules ease the distributional struggle typical of bankruptcy between the need to maintain essential 
minimum services and the creditor’s contractual rights. This distribution matters also ex ante, as 
it shapes the expectation and behavior of borrower and lenders in the next cycle of borrowing.   
Judicial vs. administrative approaches  
There are two alternative approaches to subnational insolvency: the judicial and the 
administrative. Various hybrids also exist. Judicial procedures place courts in the driver’s seat. 
Courts make key decisions to guide the restructuring process, including when and how a 
municipal insolvency is triggered, a priority structure for allocating credits among competing 
claims, and a determination of which services will be maintained. Because the debt discharge is 
highly complex, the judicial approach has the advantage of neutralizing political pressures during 
the restructuring. However, because mandates for budgetary matters lie with the executive and 12 
 
legislature in many countries, the courts’ ability to influence fiscal adjustment of subnational 
entities is limited.  
Administrative interventions, by contrast, usually allow a higher level of government to 
intervene in the entity concerned, temporarily taking direct political responsibility for many 
aspects of financial management. They may also create a belief among lenders that the central 
government will intervene, thereby creating moral hazard. 
The choice of approach varies across countries, depending on the history, political and economic 
structure, and motivation for establishing an insolvency mechanism. In Hungary, the desire to 
neutralize political pressure for bailing out insolvent SNGs favored the judicial approach. South 
Africa’s legal framework for municipal bankruptcy is a hybrid, blending administrative 
intervention with the role of courts in deciding debt restructuring and discharge. In Brazil, after 
having bailed out insolvent subnational entities in the earlier debt crises, the federal government 
chose an administrative approach in dealing with the third debt crisis by imposing a fiscal and 
debt adjustment package that was based on reform conditions. 
The United States has both judicial and administrative approaches. In response to widespread 
municipal defaults during the Great Depression, the U.S. Congress adopted a municipal 
insolvency law in 1937, known today as Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
23  Chapter 9 is 
a debt restructuring mechanism for political subdivisions and agencies of U.S. states.  It provides 
the procedural machinery whereby a debt restructuring plan acceptable to a majority of creditors 
can become binding on a dissenting minority.  Many states have adopted their own frameworks 
for dealing with municipal financial distress, for two reasons. First, municipalities are political 
subdivisions of the states. Second, state consent is a precondition for municipalities to file for 
Chapter 9 in federal court. Moreover, federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction over policy 
choices and budget priorities of the debtor. No uniform approach exists across states.
24  New 
York City’s bankruptcy in 1975 and Ohio’s early-warning fiscal monitoring system of the 
municipalities are two prominent examples of direct state intervention in resolving financial 
distress.  
Insolvency procedure 
An effective insolvency procedure contains three central elements: definition of the insolvency 
trigger for the procedure, fiscal adjustment by the debtor to bring spending in line with revenues 
and borrowing in line with the capacity to service debt, and negotiations between debtor and 
creditors to restructure debt obligations.  
Specific legal definitions serve as procedural triggers for initiating insolvency proceedings. 
While the United States and Hungary define insolvency as inability to pay, South Africa chose 
one set of triggers for serious financial problems and another for persistent material breach of 
                                                 
23 Bankruptcy Act of 1938 (Chandler Act), 50 Stat. 654 (1937), amending the 1898 U.S. Bankruptcy Act. The 1938 
act was the first legislation for municipal bankruptcy in the world. 
24 Some states give blanket consent for municipalities to file in the federal court, some states attach important 
conditions, and other states grant permission on a case-by-case basis (see Laughlin 2005). 13 
 
financial commitments.
25 In all three countries, the bankruptcy code empowers the bankruptcy 
court to dismiss petitions not filed in good faith. Because bankruptcy procedures have the power 
to discharge debt, a subnational entity may file purely for the purpose of evading debt 
obligations. An initial determination must be made as to whether the situation reflects a genuine 
“inability” to pay or rather merely “unwillingness to pay”. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code erects 
obstacles to municipal filing beyond those faced by private debtors, thereby discouraging 
strategic municipal bankruptcy filings. 
Which parties may commence an insolvency proceeding differs across countries. In the United 
States, under section 109(c)(2) of Chapter 9, only the municipality can file for bankruptcy, 
conditional on being insolvent, having worked out or attempted to work out a plan to deal with 
its debts, and having been authorized by the state to file for bankruptcy. The more stringent 
requirement for filing under Chapter 9, as comparing with filing under Chapter 11, is due to the 
constraint set by the U.S. constitution. A creditor cannot bring a municipality into a federal court 
against its will.
26  Like Chapter 9, Schwarcz’s (2002) model law for subnational insolvency 
allows only municipalities to file. In South Africa, under chapter 13, section 151(a), of the 2003 
Municipal Financial Management Act, any creditor can trigger the insolvency procedure. 
Similarly, in Hungary, a creditor can petition the court if a municipality is in arrears for more 
than 60 days.
27 
Fiscal adjustment and consolidation are preconditions for financial workouts. Often a 
subnational government’s own fiscal mismanagement is the root cause of insolvency. Even when 
subnational insolvency is triggered by macroeconomic shocks, fiscal adjustment is inherent to 
any insolvency procedures, requiring difficult political choices of cutting expenditure and raising 
revenues. Ianchovichina, Liu, and Nagarajan (2007) present a framework for analyzing 
subnational fiscal adjustment. Similar to fiscal adjustment by central governments, real interest 
rates, economic growth of the subnational economy, and the subnational government’s primary 
balance determine subnational debt sustainability. They argue, however, that subnational fiscal 
adjustment qualitatively differs from national fiscal adjustment. Unable to issue their own 
currency, SNGs cannot use seigniorage finance. They cannot freely adjust their primary balance 
because of the constraints on the taxation and expenditure system within the inter-governmental 
fiscal system.   
Debt restructuring lies at the heart of any bankruptcy framework. In administrative interventions, 
the higher level of government often restructures the subnational’s debt obligations into longer-
term debt instruments.  In the case of New York City, the Municipal Assistance Corporation was 
set up to issue longer-term bonds of the state to repay maturing short-term obligations of the city, 
conditioned on city’s fiscal and financial management reforms.
28  The 1997 debt agreements 
between the Brazilian federal government and the 25 states, focused on ex ante regulations, may 
also be viewed as an ex post intervention, because the agreements were imposed on a case-by-
case basis as a condition of debt restructuring. 
                                                 
25 Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (1937), Hungary Law on Municipal Debt Adjustment (1996), and South 
Africa Municipal Financial Management Act (2003). 
26 United States Constitution 10th amendment. 
27 See the Law on Municipal Debt Adjustment (Law XXV, 1996). 
28 Bailey (1984). 14 
 
While administrative approaches tend to focus on debt restructuring, independent courts are 
viewed as best equipped to discharge debt.  Debt discharge is a major departure from the 
principle that contracts ought to be fulfilled.
29 A mature judicial mechanism is well placed to 
ensure that discharges are fair and equitable. In South Africa, for example, the municipality 
needs to go to the court for a discharge. Administrative procedures, on the other hand, tend to 
lack the power to discharge debt.  
The adjustment of debt obligations is a major intervention in contract rights. Insolvency law 
attempts to balance this tension between creditor rights, the inability of a subnational entity to 
pay, and the continued need of the SNG to provide essential public services. It formalizes the 
relationship between creditors and the subnational debtor in financial distress. Insolvency law 
preserves the legal order by superseding contractual violations with a new legal act.
30 A 
procedure for subnational insolvency recognizes that resolving financial distress through 
mechanisms guided by law is preferable over muddling through repeated, costly, and often 
unsuccessful negotiations. 
One basic question with respect to debt restructuring is who holds the cram-down power when 
both sides fail to reach an agreement.
31 Under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, municipal 
debtors propose the debt adjustment plan, which may modify the terms of existing debt 
instruments. Such adjustment plans may be adopted over the objection of holdout creditors. 
Chapter 9 incorporates basic Chapter 11 requirements: at least one impaired class of claims 
approves the plan, and secured creditors must receive at least the value of the secured property. 
Unsecured creditors thus often lose out.
32 
Contrary to private entities, subnationals have no stockholders. Their officials need not to pay off 
unsecured creditors to remain in control. Unsecured creditors are protected by § 943 (b) (7) of 
Chapter 9, which requires the court to decide that the plan is in the “best interests of creditors 
and is feasible.”   The court would ensure that bondholders effectively receive what they would 
have received outside of bankruptcy.
33 
In Hungary, the Debt Committee, which is independent of the local government, is charged with 
preparing a reorganization plan and debt settlement proposal.
34 A debt settlement is reached if at 
least half of creditors whose claims account for at least two-thirds of total undisputed claims 
                                                 
29 In the United States, the Contracts Clause of the US Constitution (Article I. 10.1) puts the principle of contract a 
sunt servanda into constitutional form. 
30 The U.S. experience suggests that in the absence of a bankruptcy framework, public entities in financial distress 
will use every possible technicality to challenge the validity of their outstanding obligations. Widespread challenges 
in a default wave during the 19th century led to the development of the bond counsel opinion, which certifies that 
the obligation is legal, valid, and enforceable. 
31 Cram-down involves court confirmation of bankruptcy plans despite opposition of certain creditors. Under section 
1129(b) of Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, courts may thus confirm a plan if it (a) was accepted by at least 
one impaired class, (b) does not discriminate unfairly, and (c) is fair and equitable. 
32 For more detailed case histories, see Kupetz (1995) and McConnell and Picker (1993). 
33 The best interest test ensures that unsecured creditors are treated as well inside bankruptcy as outside. 
Notwithstanding, this may be less than 100% of their claims. Unsecured creditors of municipalities are protected 
from the moral hazard problem of opportunistic bankruptcy filings not by the cramdown limit but by the best 
interests of the creditors standard.  See McConnell and Picker (1993). 
34 Law on Municipal Debt Adjustment, Law XXV, 1996, Chapter II, § 9 (3) stipulates that the financial trustee’s 
independence. 15 
 
agree to the proposal. Creditors within the same group must be treated equally.
35 The Act also 
stipulates the priority of asset distributions. If disagreements arise on distribution, the court 
makes the final decision which cannot be appealed.
36   
South Africa’s legislation stipulates that debt discharge and settlement of claims must be 
approved by the court.  The settlement of claims follows the following order specified by the 
Municipal Finance Management Act: (i) secured creditors, provided that the security was given 
in good faith and at least six months before mandatory intervention by provinces; (ii) preferences 
provided by the 1936 Bankruptcy Act; and (iii) non-preferential claims be settled in proportion to 
the amount of different claims.
37 
A clear priority structure for settling competing claims expedites the resolution of debt 
restructuring. Priorities also ease the pain of sharing the reduced assets for distribution, because 
losses suffered by creditor groups may be predicted in advance. Hence, they are more likely to be 
accepted. Moreover, the structure can keep the absolute size of losses in check, since the costs of 
protracted negotiations and litigation are high and often take priority over other claims. Priorities 
are a policy choice with a variety of trade-offs. If the lending community perceives that financial 
distress is mostly resolved on its back, then desirable future lending could suffer. The shadow of 
priorities provides the backstop for voluntary restructuring negotiations, shaping bargaining 
power of creditors and debtor even outside bankruptcy.  
However, distributing the pool of available assets in bankruptcy is not only about efficiency and 
equal treatment. Which policy is most appropriate for the bankruptcy of subnational entities will 
depend, first, on the distributional judgment of the society concerned and, second, on the effect 
of a chosen priority structure on the capital market and its impact of new financing during a 
liquidity crunch. It is also important to allow sufficient flexibility within a general priority 
framework. 
5.  Conclusions 
As a result of worldwide decentralization, subnational debt has become an increasing share of 
consolidated public debt – combined central and subnational government debt.  Rapid 
urbanization and demand for large scale urban infrastructure will continue to create pressure on 
the public finance system to finance sustainable investments. In many countries decentralization 
has devolved the responsibility for most of infrastructure investments to SNGs.  Managing 
subnational debt financing and its sustainability is critical to a sustainable public finance system 
and sovereign financial health. 
As noted by Canuto and Liu (2010a), the financial crisis has had a significant impact on the 
financial accounts of many SNGs, as a result of slowing economic growth, uncertainty over cost 
of financing, and pressure on primary balances.  Beyond the current crisis, structural trends of 
                                                 
35 Law on Municipal Debt Adjustment, Law XXV, 1996, Chapter III, § 23. 
36 Law on Municipal Debt Adjustment, Law XXV, 1996, Chapter IV, § 31. Assets are distributed to creditors in the 
following order: (1) regular personnel benefits including severance pay; (2) securitized debt; (3) dues to the central 
government; (4) social insurance debts, taxes, public contributions and tax; (5) other claims; and (6) interest and fees 
on debt obligations continued during the bankruptcy proceeding. 
37 South Africa, Municipal Finance and Management Act, 2003, Chapter 13, Section 155 (4). 16 
 
decentralization and urbanization are likely to continue with force with the need to finance urban 
infrastructure investments.    
Unlike the 1990s when subnational debt crisis affected major developing countries, SNGs in 
various major developing countries entered the current global financial crisis with stronger 
liquidity and fiscal positions, as a result of the reforms in fiscal rules and regulatory frameworks 
established in these countries.
38  However, there are continuing pressures on subnational finance 
– from the uncertainty of the global public debt market, potential risks of rising cost of capital, 
fragility of global recovery, and currency uncertainties and associated refinancing risks (Canuto 
and Liu, 2010b). 
There are also risks of increasing contingent liabilities.  As a result of debt limitations that have 
been imposed on SNGs, shifting borrowing off budget may become a convenient way of 
circumventing fiscal rules.  To cope with rising demand for infrastructure, given the limited 
fiscal space, various forms of infrastructure investing become tempting: public private 
partnerships, special purpose vehicles, and off budget financing. 
A range of middle income countries and low income countries with transition to market access 
are also contemplating expanding subnational borrowing and debt financing.  Before doing so, 
the first priority should be to establish clear fiscal rules for SNGs specifying the type and 
purpose of borrowing, the procedural steps for contracting debt, any limitations on borrowing, 
and control and accounting for off-budget liabilities.  
Ex post insolvency mechanisms are also essential to the sustainability of SNG debt financing.  
Even if rarely invoked, they shape expectations about defaults and allow and encourage the 
stakeholders to resolve subnational financial distress efficiently. Notwithstanding the fiscal 
problems of a particular SNG, an effective insolvency system helps maintain access of other 
SNGs to the public finance markets.  Clear and predictable rules on priority of repayment ease 
the struggle and allow faster resolution of financial distress.  Effective insolvency and creditor 
rights systems allow better management of financial risks.
39 
Managing subnational default risks is intertwined with broader macroeconomic and institutional 
reforms. Macroeconomic stability and sovereign strength cap the financial ratings of SNG, and 
thereby determine the availability and cost of funds for SNGs.  Moreover, the intergovernmental 
fiscal system underpins the fundamentals of the subnational fiscal path. Without increased fiscal 
autonomy and greater own-source revenues, SNGs will rarely be in a position to borrow 
sustainably on their own. Furthermore, to manage default risks is not to minimize SNG access to 
debt financing. On the contrary, developing a competitive and diversified subnational credit 
market is critical to intermediating national savings and infrastructure financing. Thus an 
                                                 
38 In Brazil, SNGs’ net debt as a percent of GDP decreased from 18 percent in 2003 to 14 percent in 2007. In India, 
the fiscal deficit of states declined from 4.0 percent of GDP on average in 2000–05 to 1.5 percent in 2007–08; and 
states achieved positive operating balances.  In Colombia, gross debt as share of GDP for subnational governments 
declined from 3.6 percent in 2001 to 1.42 percent in 2008. Sources: government Websites.  
39 The World Bank (2005) addresses creditor rights and insolvency standards in the context of corporate bankruptcy. 
Key principles apply to the subnational context, bearing in mind the differences between public and private 
bankruptcy. 17 
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